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Abstract:
During the past few years, empirical economic growth modeling has emerged by
constructing and testing numerous model and explanatory variable alternatives. One of the
most promising recent idea consists that also religious aspects should be included as
explanatory variables into economic growth models, therefore capturing influences of
culture, moral and ethics. Moral institutions and ethics affect the economic development,
as for example, trust and honesty are essential requirements for emerging economic
activity. Religious activities and beliefs are documented over a long time period in many
Western economies, making quantitative empirical time series data available. Following
the idea and argumentation by Barro and McCleary (2003a, 2002), “religious production
efficiency” measure is constructed and used in economic growth regressions for 8 OECD
countries, proxying quantifiable dimensions of culture. By using panel estimation methods
and additionally time-series estimations for each country, rather than usual cross-country
regressions, more information is gained concerning the country specific growth and
religion characteristics. Empirical evidence from the panel data estimations seems to
suggest that religious beliefs attain more relevance than religious attendance. Religious
production efficiency, containing both belief and activity aspects, was not found
statistically significant with panel data or with individual 8 OECD countries growth model,
except for Finland. Significant coefficient for Finland can be explained by referring to
Finland’s unique religious market properties, as the level of religious beliefs have
historically been unusually high, and continue to be, in Finland. On the other hand,
attendance in religious activities has followed the typical Northern-European decreasing
trend and levels. Nevertheless, defectiveness of theoretical background for analyzing the
relationship between economic and religious phenomenon is apparent. More exact
understanding on the links between these concepts are essentially needed to better model
the economic consequences of cultural, religious and moral variables. Therefore, several
suggestions are presented to gain better growth information in the future empirical growth
modeling, including better theoretical background, more robust estimation techniques and
longer data.3
1. Introduction
Explosion of research on economic growth has improved the outcomes of empirical growth
models. Nevertheless, more accuracy is needed, because the gap between theoretical
growth models and their empirical evidence remains still pretty wide. Economic scrutiny
needs to simulate models and empirically analyze their predictions to real-world data, as is
emphasized  by Klenow and Rodriques-Clare (1997). Mysteries of data generating process
of economic growth remain unsolved. The Summers-Heston type of data has been
extensively mined and the growth scholars are experiencing kind of “regression fatigue”,
but the researchers continue to show some ingenuity in finding new and interesting
variables to combine with the data set. There is a routine call for more detailed studies of
individual country experience (Temple 1999).
Robert J. Barro and Rachel M. McCleary (2003a, 2002) have argued that economic growth
depends on religious activity of the economy’s consumers. The most interesting result is
that economic growth depends on the extent of religious believing relative to belonging.
They define the productivity of the religion sector to be the level of belief expressed
relative to attendance in religious activities. According to Barro and McCleary, religious
beliefs are positively related to economic growth and negatively to church attendance.
Patterns remained intact when instrumental variables to control for possible reverse
causation were used. That kind of growth modeling, sometimes known as “Barro
regressions”, means using a more or less ad hoc regressions, driven in its specification
mainly by previous results in the literature.
According to Barro and McCleary, the current state of economic growth analysis is such
that explanations of economic performance have to go beyond narrow measures of
economic variables to encompass political and social factors. The empirical growth
research reveal important influences on growth from policies and institutions. Economic
growth models should also include variables for nation's culture, moral and ethics (Barro
2000). Probably the best proxy for that is religion, as it is well documented for a long time
in many Western economies, making quantitative empirical data available and measuring
quantifiable dimensions of culture.4
Based on the previous economic growth models (as Barro 1997), in studies by Barro and
McCleary (2002, 2003a) the growth rate of per capita GDP is analyzed by using religious
variables as explanatory variables. Their most interesting, finding is that religion seems to
affect economic growth (but not the other way around). In Barro's growth model,
coefficient on church attendance was significantly negative, whereas that on beliefs was
significantly positive. The implication is that the main growth effect is a positive response
to an increase in religious believing relative to religious attending. This finding is
understandable if believing is seen as the fundamental output of the religion sector.
Economic growth is then positively related to the productivity of the religion sector in the
sense of the level of belief expressed relative to sector inputs, which include the level of
church attendance. The analysis support the notion that an increase in religious beliefs or a
decrease in church attendance tend to stimulate also economic growth.
The purpose of this study is to test the claim made by Barro and McCleary by using time-
series data, panel estimation methods, and extent the analysis to individual country level
(by using data from 8 OECD countries). Panel estimation results find some support for the
notion that the strength of religious beliefs affect positively the economic growth.
Additionally, in the countries with strong religious bases (USA, Spain, Finland), religious
beliefs and religious attendance variables seem to support the hypothesis of Barro and
McCleary that religious beliefs affect positively and religious attendance activity
negatively the economic growth. Nevertheless, this study failed to find wide support for
the idea of “religious production efficiency” measure, suggested by Barro and McClearly.
The religious efficiency variable was found statistically significant only for Finland among
the eight countries tested.
2. Discussion on the role of religion on economic growth
One of the founding writings on the economic consequences of religion is Max Weber's
“Die Protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus”, where he argues that the
Protestant Reformation made possible the advance of modern capitalism. Protestantism
made a previously unseen emphasis on individual responsibility, personal diligence and
approved risk-taking and financial self-improvement  (Weber 1904). Nevertheless, there is
mixed empirical evidence backing the Protestant Ethic thesis. For example, it has been5
shown
1 that most capitalist institutions preceded the Protestant Reformation. Some also
argue, that during the beginning of modern capitalism, economic progress in Europe was
uncorrelated with Protestant religion, in a sense that in Netherlands, Catholic families had
more wealth than Protestants. Nevertheless, several scholars
2 note that Christian religion
overall has enabled rapid economic growth, versus the economic and intellectual
development in Islamic countries for most of millennium. This is explained to depend on
Islam's static world-view. Numerous scholars continue to emphasize especially
Protestantism as being positively correlated with growth and development (Grier 1997). It
should also be remembered, that the empirical evidence only rejects the specific channel
proposed by Weber (Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales 2003), not a more general link between
the Protestant ethic and the development of a capitalist attitude.
Weber's (1904) main thesis was that religion may be a significant positive or negative force
on economic development. The effect would be positive if religion looked favorably on the
accumulation of material wealth, perhaps in conjunction with rewards obtained in an after-
life. This argumentation could fit into Calvinist Protestantism. Weber argued that the
Protestant ethic is inherently about applying religious meaning to economic behavior, as
for example, labor was seen as a moral duty. However, as Keely notes (2003, p.286),
Weber otherwise downplayed the role of religious beliefs in determining economic
performance. He claimed that capitalism did not rely on the Protestant ethic, but rather
needed only the initial push of the ethic and afterwards any work ethic remaining is devoid
of religious meaning.
Hanssmann and Millendorfer have argued that especially Protestant Christian value system
produces serious labor involvement and economic efficiency, deriving from an ethic of
discipline, self-denial, hard work and systematic planning for the future. Conversion to
Protestantism has meant a profound cultural revolution (Hanssmann 2000, Millendorfer
1984). The logic of the assumed positive effect mechanism is that a cultural trait affects
certain values or beliefs, and those beliefs in turn influence one's economic decision-
making and thus economic outcomes. The possible association of cultural factors (religion
                                                          
1  Samuelsson, K. (1993), Anderson, and Tollison, R., (1992),  Delacroix, (1992), Tawney, R.H., (1926)
2  Greif, A. (1994), Kuran (1997), Kuran (1995), Chiswick, B. (1983)6
as a proxy with good data resources for empirical analysis purposes) with differences in
economic performance is assumed.
Religion can also increase economic development by promoting a positive attitude toward
honesty. Religion may increase levels of trust and reduce levels of corruption and criminal
activity, increase a nation's openness to strangers and thus make the economy more open to
foreign investments and employees. Religion may encourage thrift, which would stimulate
saving, investments and therefore economic growth. At the same time, religion may lead to
better health levels (by discouraging ''sinful'' activities as drugs, over-eating, gambling,
alcohol, etc.). Higher health levels in the society would raise productivity through labor
force efficiency.
Adam Smith noted in his Theory of Moral Sentiments that religious beliefs provide strong
incentives to follow moral structures which support economic growth. A concept of
supreme being constitutes internal moral enforcement mechanism and a system of
internalized moral monitoring (Anderson 1988). Cosgel and Minkler have suggested that
the concepts of integrity, commitment and identity help to understand the religious
behavior and its consequences. Religious behavior serves as a communicating and
signaling device of individual’s identity and commitment (Minkler and Cosgel, 2004).
Negative factors could be religious restrictions on capital accumulation, profit-making,
credit markets and interest. Religion may also increase resource allocation towards church
activities (cathedral building) and therefore removing resources from free market activities.
Violent behavior or civil unrest may either increase or decrease because of religion.
Several fundamental Christian beliefs seem also to contradict the values and morals of
modern capitalism and secular economics
3, as argued by Beed and Beed (1996).
At the same time it has been found that at the microeconomic level of individuals and
households, economic behavior and outcomes do correlate with religion. Even more
stronger links exist between religiosity and a wide range of economically relevant social
behavior, such as criminal activity, drug and alcohol consumption, physical and mental
                                                          
3 During the last centuries, the continuing debate has been whether economics can be seen Christian or non-
Christian. The debate can be traced back to at least Engels, F. (1844), who wrote ”our economics is
essentially Christian”.7
health, marriage, fertility and divorce. US Jews have an average significantly higher wages
and income as Christian population, largely due to their high levels of education
4. Brenner
and Kiefer (1981) argue that in response to long-continuing persecution, Jews emphasize
the value of education, as it is portable and non-expropriable versus land or physical
capital. Chiswick (1983, 1985) notes that Jews acquire high levels of education because of
their high rate of return on schooling. This high rate of return is due to large investments in
child quality, seen in small family size and mothers' tendency to stay home when raising
children. Also Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2003) find out that religious beliefs,
especially Christian religion, are positively associated with attitudes conductive to
economic growth, free markets and better institutions. On the negative side, religious
people are found to be more intolerant and less sympathetic to women's rights.
Religious effects on economic behavior are found to be substantively large and statistically
significant (Iannaccone 1998, pp.1475-1476), but the possibility remains that religion's
statistical effect is spurious. There exists underlying characteristics that form both religious
and other activities. Well-behaving children may avoid drugs, stay in school and go to
church. People with liberal values will probably stay away from conservative
denominations. Nevertheless, there exist plausible a priori arguments for religion's impact.
Freeman (1986) has noted that churchgoing positively affects the allocation of time, school
attendance, work activity and the frequency of socially deviant activity (crime, drugs,
alcohol) and that at least some part of the churchgoing effect is the result of an actual
causal impact. Several other economists
5 have observed significantly lower rates of violent
and nonviolent crime in geographical areas with higher rates of religious membership.
There exists a large empirical literature on the relationship between religion and different
forms of sociological deviance
6 (including crime, suicide, divorce, drugs, non-marital sex,
etc.). Typical result from these analyzes is that youth raised in highly religious homes are
less likely to engage in criminal activity, use drugs or alcohol, or engage in premarital sex.
Effects are found to be especially strong for children raised in strict denominations or
religiously homogenous communities. Empirical studies consistently find that high rates of
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5 Lipford, McCormick, R. and Tollison, (1993)
6 for a good survey on literature, see (Iannaccone1998, p.1476-1478).8
religious activity and commitment are linked with mental health, reduced stress and
increased life satisfaction. Religious effects seem to persist even after controlling the
models for age, income, gender, education, etc. Several epidemiological studies on
statistically significant religious effects are reported in several medicine journals. Members
of strict religious groups (Mormons, 7th Day Adventists, etc.) seem to enjoy longer lives
and lower rates of cancer, stroke, hypertension and heart disease, because they follow
several health-related every-day restrictions. Broader correlation between health and
religiosity have many causes, including a negative link between faith and stress, or a
positive link between church involvement and social support
7.
A significant relationship between religion and economically relevant behavior does not
straightforwardly imply similar relationship between religion and economic attitudes. The
degree of religiosity is not found to influence consumer's attitudes concerning capitalism,
socialism, income redistribution, private property, free trade and government regulation.
Every religious tradition and sacred literature seem to contain enough ambiguity to justify
any number of economic positions. Iannaccone (1998) notes that despite media hype
concerning the conservatism of the ''Religious Right'', opinion polls consistently find that
the economic attitudes of those groups are no more conservative than those of other
Protestants. On several dimensions (income re-distributions, aid to the poor) they are
significantly less conservative than the average American. Their conservatism is expressed
in a set of theological, moral and social issues (school prayer, abortion, sexual conduct),
but which are independent of their economic attitudes.
Religions economic impact seems to be significant, but not uniform. Religion affects
strongly some behavioral outcomes. Life satisfaction is related to levels of religious belief
and physical health and deviance is strongly related to levels of involvement. On the other
hand, religious activity has no uniform or equally strong effect related to some other
variables (earnings, education, economic attitudes). Many effects vary across
denominations, which are usually strongest in sectarian groups. This lack of uniformity is
seen as a proof against spurious correlation due to any simple form of omitted
heterogeneity. Religious effects do not reduce to a single unobserved factor, such as
                                                                                                                                                                               
7 Levin, J.S. (1994)9
goodness, conservatism, credulity or risk aversion, which implies a need for more
sophisticated models of religious behavior and economy (Iannaccone 1998, p.1478).
3. Theoretical considerations and methods
Theoretical background in this paper follows standard neoclassical endogenous growth
models, as Romer (1990) and Jones (1995a), also following the argumentation used by
Barro (1990) and Romer (1990), which essentially are outgrowth versions of Ramsey-





Only alternation here is R, which denotes the influence of an economy’s religious sector on
the productivity of economy. Influence of the religious sector R, is assumed to be the
product of three factors
R = f (τ, ω, Sr)( 2 )
Where τ is time devoted to religious activity, namely religious attendance, and ω consists
the religious beliefs held by the representative individuals. The stock of “religious capital”
Sr assumes religious consumption to be accumulating, so that past religious experience
accumulates religious capital. Individual households are assumed to maximize utility,
which is derived from R, in addition to consumption and leisure.
Max U = u (c, (1-l), R) (3)
In equation (3) l denotes time used for working and c consumption. Religious capital is
assumed to remain in initial condition, zero. Explicit functional form of R is assumed by
Barro and McCloskey (2003a) to be the relation between religious beliefs and religious
attendance.
R = ω / τ (4)
This testable relation implies that τ<0 and ω>0. Production and output is reduced by
increase in τ, which is assumed to be third alternative in addition to leisure and work. On
the other hand, ω is assumed to contribute positively to R, which proxies the moral and
ethical institutions of the society which support the emerging economy.10
Contemporary growth theory implies several types of empirical models to be used in
explaining real per capital GDP growth. Various alternative variables were considered for
the final estimated model, using argumentation of previous growth literature. Table 1
presents the final explanatory variables used for explaining the economic growth rates,
some of the most important previous studies using that variable and the assumed signs of
the coefficients.
Inclusion of population and population growth is derived from the family of simple Solow-
Swan growth models, where labor growth is one of the most important explanatory
variable. In those older studies (Solow (1956), Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992)),
negative association between economic growth and population growth were usually
assumed, but further empirical evidence remains controversial (Temple 1999, p.142).
Endogenous growth models with R&D sectors, as Romer 1990, emphasize the possibility
of positive relationship between population and economic growth. Therefore, the signs
assumed for population growth and the level of population are ambiguous.
New growth models with the endogenous growth option, usually include fertility rate as
explanatory variable. That is sometimes substituted for using either mortality rate or life
expectancy variables. Importance of fertility rate for economic growth has been
emphasized especially by G. Becker (see f.e. Becker, Glaeser, Murphy (1999) and Becker
(1988)). In this study, fertility rate was found to have the strongest statistical significance
compared to mortality rate or life expectancy (they also have high correlation), and they
are omitted. Variables for schooling enrollment and educational attainment implies
modeling the human capital measure.
Several macroeconomic variables are included. Investment ratio (the ratio of real gross
domestic investment to real GDP) and ratio of public to total investment should contribute
positively to economic growth, while government expenditure is assumed to substitute
private investment and consumption and affect negatively to economic growth. Inclusion
of inflation measure is strongly recommended in literature, as early as in Balassa (1964).
Large inflation and variability in prices are causing uncertainty in the economy, reducing
investment demand and economic growth. Extent of foreign trade and international
openness is assumed to contribute positively to growth and is modeled by using a variable11
which summarizes export and import activity in relation to GNP. Initial level of GDP is
usually added to gather convergence information in cross-country studies. Lower levels of
initial GDP imply more rapid growth until the steady-state growth is attained. This idea
traces back to Baumol (1986), which gained strong results supporting convergence, the
result later criticized by De Long (1988) for spurious data formulation. In this study, initial
GDP level was not used, but dynamic panel models are estimated by using one-period
lagged economic growth rate as explaining variable.
One fully unsolved methodological problem in empirical growth analysis is the choice
between cross-country, panel and time series econometric model. While the use of cross-
country data is the most common type, it contains severe estimation problems, which are
well summarized in Temple (1999), including parameter heteroscedasticity, difficulty of
unobserved fixed effects, outliers, measurement errors, endogeneity, error correlation,
model uncertainty and regional spillovers, just to name a few. Therefore, the standard
errors in most growth regressions should be treated with a certain degree of mistrust
(Temple 2000).
A promising alternative is to use panel data methods, which allow one to control for
omitted variables that are persistent over time. By moving to a panel data framework,
unobserved heterogeneity can be controlled. Nevertheless, some severe problems remain,
as the finite sample properties of most dynamic panel data estimators are not yet well
understood. There are also worries about the use of fixed effects specifications, as panel
data modeling usually use fixed effects approaches to analyze the effects of variables that
are fairly constant over time, or that will affect growth only with a long lag.
Standard transformations are likely to exacerbate the problem of measurement errors, at
least if these errors are not persistent. They typically lead to a large fall in precision, since
in effect the between country variation is thrown away.
In this paper, it is argued that growth research should go further than using panels.
Standard cross-section methods throw away useful information, while panel data methods
make unjustifiable assumptions about parameter homogeneity. Instead, country parameters
should be estimated separately using time series regressions for each country. Jones (1995)
is one good example of that kind of new emphasis on empirical growth analysis.12
Using time-series data in growth analysis brings other problems. The limited timespan of
the available data makes it difficult to discern the long-run effect of variables like inflation.
This means that the short-run variation in growth rates may be dominated by business
cycle effects, not by changes in fundamental long-run growth prospects. The annual data
used in this paper covers the years 1971-2001, which limits the degrees of freedom in
regressions, and eliminates the use of a long lag structure.
4. Empirical results
The data consists values for religious production efficiency and real GNP growth rates for
thirty years and forms a balanced panel. The real GNP data is from OECD annual statistics
and religious variables are constructed from the continuing series of World Value Survey
(WVS). Data includes time series for 8 OECD countries (USA, Germany, Japan, Spain,
Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark), gathered for period 1971-2001. The panel
models were estimated first by using dynamic panel data estimation techniques, namely
fixed-effects (within) one-step GMM estimation and country-specific estimations were
done by using time-series SUR-estimation technique. Fixed effects panel model was
chosen over random effects model by applying Hausman tests.
The final specification of estimated growth system has the following form:
(5)
Descriptive statistics of religious variables constructed are presented in tables 2-4 in the
appendix. Table 2 consists descriptions of religious belief variable, constructed by using
World Values Survey data on people’s belief on the existence of afterlife hell. Mean values
of each country variables have a straightforward interpretation, implying that people in the
US have the highest percentage value for belief, as 73.3% in the US believe that there
exists a place called hell in afterlife. The value is pretty high for Catholic Spain (37.8%).
Scandinavian countries have typically been examples of modern secular societies, with low
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level of religious beliefs, property seen in low levels of belief in hell for Sweden, Norway
and Denmark. Finland is clearly different in that context, as it has high level of belief in
hell (34.0%).
Religious activity is measured as church attendance at least once a month and descriptive
statistics are presented in table 3. All the Scandinavian countries (including Finland) have
low levels of church attendance (Finland 12.4%, Sweden 12.7%, Norway 12.9% and
Denmark 9.4%), all having decreasing trend. US and Spain are examples of countries with
high religious activity, as 53.0% and 42.0% of population attain church monthly,
respectively.
When religious production efficiency variable is constructed (relation between believing
and attending) Finland gets a high value, which is understandable, as it is characterized by
high level of believing versus low church attending activity. Japan seems to have similarly
high religious efficiency, but the heterogeneity of Japan’s religious market makes the
interpretation of its true meaning to be extremely difficult. Germany and Sweden have low
religious production efficiency. Reason for that would be that, Sweden and Germany have
both low level of believing (lowest for Sweden with Denmark) and Germany has
additionally modest church attendance (large part of its population in Catholic).
Estimation results from panel models are presented in table 5. Most variables suggested by
previous economic growth models seem to gain statistical significance, with assumed signs
(table 1). When religious activity and beliefs are analyzed separately in panel estimation
(Model 2 in table 5), it seems that the extend of religious beliefs are more important for
growth. Religious efficiency variable was not found to be statistically different from zero.
Country specific regression results for variables implying religious factors are presented in
table 6. Variable for religious production efficiency is significant (t-value 2.44) in 5% level
only for Finland. For Finland and some other countries, the coefficient is positive as
implied by the argumentation by Barro (2003a, 2002). It should be noted, that all the
countries with positive religious efficiency coefficient (Finland, USA, Spain) are known as
strongly religious countries. Those countries have the highest rate of religious beliefs (table
1), and USA and Spain have the highest religious attendance rates (table 2). Spain is14
Christian catholic country, while USA is mainly Christian Reformist Protestant and
Finland is Christian Lutheran Protestant.
Religious belief (belief in the existence of Hell) is statistically significant for Finland,
Sweden, and Spain. The coefficient for religious beliefs is positive, as suggested by
argumentation, for all countries except for Sweden and Denmark. Validity and usability of
variable for religious activity seems to be problematic. Its significance and consistency of
sign (expected to be negative) remains weak. Coefficient for religious activity is significant
and negative for Finland and Spain (positive for Japan).
Explanation for different behavior of Finland’s religious variables might be in that Finland
has clearly different religious behavior characteristics compared to all other countries.
Finland has a long history of strong protestant revivals and that explains why its level of
religious beliefs is still pretty high compared to other pretty secular Scandinavian and
Northern European countries.
5. Conclusion
Religious beliefs and activity give information on the properties of society’s cultural and
ethical base, and therefore they have some relevance when long term economic growth is
considered. Moral institutions and ethics affect the economic development, as for example,
trust and honesty are essential requirements for emerging economic activity. Empirical
evidence seems to suggest that religious beliefs attain more relevance than religious
attendance. Religious production efficiency, containing both belief and activity aspects,
was not found statistically significant in 8 major OECD countries growth model, except for
Finland. Significant coefficient for Finland can be explained by referring to Finland’s
unique religious market properties, as the level of religious beliefs have historically been
unusually high, and continue to be, in Finland. On the other hand, attendance in religious
activities has followed the typical Northern-European decreasing trend and levels.
Nevertheless, defectiveness of theoretical background for analyzing the relationship
between economic and religious phenomenon is apparent. More exact understanding on the
links between these concepts are essentially needed to better model the economic15
consequences of cultural, religious and moral variables. We do not have any clear evidence
on whether the relation between economy and religions is one- or two-directional, neither
on how this link operates.
Secondly, more accurate and longer time series data should be gathered to better estimate
the long-term growth paths. In this paper, little more than 30 year annual data is used,
which probably tells more on short-term business cycle behavior than underlying long-
term economic growth. Third failure is to find appropriate econometric method for this
estimation. Cross-country analyses are unable to present valid and well-specified
estimators as the parameters most probably are heterogeneous, of which proofs were found
also in this paper. The cross-country growth model parameters are not constant across
units, but the countries have all different model relating growth to its determinants. Panel
data methods offer a good alternative, but problems with statistical inference remain and
the interpretation of estimators may be difficult. Additionally, more decrees of freedom
would be required. Analysis of interdependence between economic and religious variables
is just in its early stages and offers interesting research agenda for future economic
scrutiny. Increased understanding on that link has the potential to give economic growth
theory and empirical analysis a major boost forward.16
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APPENDIX.
Tables, notes and abbreviations.
Table 1. Variables for (per capita) economic growth estimation. Assumed signs.
Explaining variable Representative research Assumed
sign
Investment rate , I/GDP Solow (1956) ; Rebelo (1990) +
Population growth Pritchett (1996) ; Romer (1990) - / +
Population Kremer (1993) - / +
Fertility rate Becker, Glaeser, Murphy (1999) ; Becker, Murphy,
Tamura (1990) ; Becker (1988), Barro (1989)
-
Schooling Romer (1990) ; Barro (1991) +
Government expenditure, G/GDP Barro (1990) -
Inflation Balassa (1964) ; Agarwala (1983) -




Table 2. Descriptive statistics of religious beliefs w (belief in Hell)
Finland Sweden Norway Denmark USA Germany Spain Japan
Mean 0.340 0.116 0,219 0,096 0,733 0,195 0,378 0,304
s 0,099 0,021 0,028 0,045 0,015 0,104 0,051 0,054
Skewness -0,658 -0,130 0,556 2,373 -0,366 2,170 0,390 2,084




















Table 3. Descriptive statistics of religious activity t (church attendance at least once a month).
Finland Sweden Norway Denmark USA Germany Spain Japan
Mean 0.124 0.127 0,129 0,094 0,530 0,296 0,410 0,104
s 0,015 0,036 0,0214 0,019 0,160 0,085 0,219 0,044
Skewness 0,587 0,024 -1,280 -0,905 -2,169 -1,475 -1,383 -1,894




















Table 4. Descriptive statistics of religious production efficiency variable R
Finland Sweden Norway Denmark USA Germany Spain Japan
Mean 2.695 0.989 1,704 1,155 1,529 0,863 1,691 3,925
s 0,595 0,411 0,203 0,857 0,711 0,921 2,134 3,804
Skewness -1,876 1,768 1,828 2,152 2,220 2,146 2,232 2,290




















Table 5. Panel estimation results for economic growth. Fixed effects (within) models.






















































































3.21    [0.003] **
0.332







Note: Hausman test suggested for using fixed-effects vs. random-effects model, c
2(11)= 22.30 [0.0222] *24
Table 6. Estimation results for economic growth with appended religious variables.


















































































































DW 2.49 2.03 2.09 2.75 2.14 2.40 2.82 2.65
Notes: Std.errors in parenthesis, below parenthesis are the t-values. * denotes statistical
significance in 5% and ** in 1% level.25
Additional information on the model variables:
Annual time series data is from the period 1971-2001. (Some variables include interpolating
technique for controlling some missing values). Country specific data includes 8 OECD countries:
Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, USA, Germany, Spain, Japan).
-  Per capita real GDP growth, common PPP, differential natural log
-  Belief in Hell, yes answer, % of population
-  Church attendance, at least monthly, % of population
-  Population (in millions), natural log
-  Growth rate of population
-  Inflation rate, %, consumer price
-  Fertility rate, total
-  Government final consumption expenditure, common (1995) prices
-  Gross fixed capital formation, total, common (1995) prices
-  Exports of goods and services, common (1995) prices
-  Imports of goods and services, common (1995) prices
-  Gross domestic product (expenditure approach, common (1995) prices.
-  Ratio of real domestic investment (private plus public) to real GDP
-  Ratio of real government consumption to real GDP
-  Ratio of real government consumption to total domestic investments
-  Ratio of export plus import to real GDP
-  Second level schooling completed of the total population aged 15 and over, %.
Data from World Values Surveys, in the courtesy of  Finnish Social Science Data Archive, FSD, Tampere,
Finland: The data uses the following material: World values surveys and European values surveys, 1981-
1984, 1990-1993 and 1995-1997 [Elektroninen aineisto]. By Ronald Inglehart [et al.]. ICPSR version. Ann
Arbor, MI : Institute for Social Research, 2000. Ann Arbor, MI : Inter-university Consortium for Political
and Social Research ; Tampere : Yhteiskuntatieteellinen tietoarkisto, 2000. World Values Survey 2000:
Suomen aineisto. Versio 4. Suomen Gallup & Kirkon tutkimuskeskus. Tampere : Yhteiskuntatieteellinen
tietoarkisto, 2003.